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I assert that China's responsiveness and that in the long-run adjusted position on non-
intervention towards conflict is strategic. It demonstrates to its African partners and to 
the greater international community, namely the West, that China is not only an 
unconcerned development partner solely seeking to extract raw resources throughout 
the continent, and that it has become more cooperative with and supportive of the 
Western-led initiative of being a global responsible stakeholder. Thus, their reputation 
benefits and helps to sustain their growing presence and influence within Africa, as well 
as benefits its reputation and stature as an increasingly accommodating and responsible 
emerging power in the international community. 
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Chapter 1: China’s and the United States’ Foreign Policy Principles 
Introduction 
The Chinese government and its companies have significantly increased their 
presence throughout the continent of Africa during the past two decades – so much so 
that by the end of the last decade, China has become Africa’s biggest trading partner 
(Sun, 7). China is an attractive source of development aid and foreign investment 
because of its stated policy of non-intervention; that is, the Chinese government pledges 
that it will remain uninvolved in the internal affairs of the countries it works with. 
Because of this policy, China’s relationship with and presence within the African 
continent has rapidly grown during the past two decades. Yet as the relationship 
between China and the African continent grows, so does the challenge for China to keep 
its significant economic engagements separate from the socio-political realities of its 
African partners – particularly in regard to issues concerning peace and security.  
In a shift away from its initial firm adherence to the longstanding foreign policy 
principle of non-intervention, China appears – via verbal statements from Chinese 
government officials and concrete actions taken by the Chinese government – to be 
assuming an increasingly assertive, active and engaged role towards upholding peace 
and security throughout the continent.  
My research first aims to answer these two key questions: first, what are the 
primary factors influencing China’s adjustment of its China-Africa policy, with specific 
focus placed on its non-intervention principle? Second, what is the extent of this 
adjustment? China’s relationship with Sudan and South Sudan offers a valuable and 
relevant lens through which to observe concrete examples of China’s policy shift in 
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response to violent conflict. In this thesis, I try to elucidate some of the reasons why 
China would change its approach. I use the Sudan case to help show these factors. 
Examining China’s relationship with Sudan, with a focus on the years between 1996 
and 2011, provides a useful example of China’s early and rigid adherence to non-
intervention, as well as its contemporary adjustment of this policy. Then, examining 
China’s relationship with independent South Sudan from 2011 up to the present 
provides a useful counter-example to contrast China’s unprecedented and 
internationally recognized shift in its foreign policy: namely, its recent incongruent 
assertive diplomatic actions in relation to its non-intervention principle in response to 
South Sudan’s ongoing civil conflict. Analyzing China’s relationship with South Sudan 
provides both rhetorical and concrete evidence of China’s growing willingness to 
actively contribute to upholding peace and security on the continent when needed.  
This is an important strategic decision for China’s government. For the vast 
majority of African nations, China is an emerging and attractive alternative 
development partner compared to traditional Western donors. But, one major criticism 
of China’s foreign policy approach voiced by African governments, as well as the rest 
of the international community, notably the West, is that non-intervention has allowed 
China to side-step its global responsibility as an emerging economic super power to 
uphold peace and security where relevant among its various Chinese-African relations. 
If this responsibility continues to be ignored, China’s political and economic 
relationship with Africa, its attempt to been recognized as a responsible development 
partner, and thus an appealing alternative to traditional Western aid donors, faces a real 
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threat despite the appeal non-intervention has offered and continues to present – but 
China is currently and actively addressing this criticism. 
Drawing conclusions from China’s partnerships with Sudan and South Sudan, 
China appears to be following through with its stated commitment to adjust its foreign 
policy approach to be more responsive and act responsibly towards conflict situations 
where it does business. This is particularly due to Western pressure, and indicates that 
China is edging towards Western-style intrusiveness in response to major humanitarian 
crises – but not so far as to abandon its foundational foreign policy of non-intervention. 
In doing so, China strengthens not only its ability to maintain its status as an important 
alternative development partner in Africa, but also its global reputation as a responsible 
stakeholder and a constructive cooperative force in multilateral international 
peacekeeping initiatives.  
Origin and Philosophy of the West’s Foreign Policy Principles 
The West’s political and economic influence in Africa stems from its colonial 
history within the continent, and continues to endure to present day following the 
gradual release of colonial control throughout the mid-20th century. As Asian-African 
relations expert Chris Alden indicates regarding Sino-African relations in his 
comprehensive book, China in Africa, “The West’s long-standing engagement with 
Africa…has been predicated upon a conflation of economic interests, Great Power 
rivalries and a desire to reshape African societies” (Alden, 93). As Western interests 
became closely aligned largely due to political and ideological solidarity during the 
Cold War and increased European integration, so did the interests of many emerging 
African leaders to integrate the West’s free market economic and democratic political 
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values into their own national development agendas (Alden, 94). In concert with OECD 
countries (the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development), Western 
international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, as well as the G8, Africa’s strongest states, led by South Africa, 
formed a common development agenda for Africa (Alden, 94). Western interest for the 
development of African countries began in the G8. Conceived following the 1973 oil 
crisis, the G8 is lead by the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and 
Russia (as of 1998), and through annual summit meetings hosting financial ministers 
and heads of governments, the G8 serves to unite and promote economic policies to 
steer the global economy in line with its shared interests (Alden, 94). Although once 
narrowly focused on economic concerns, these summit meetings have expanded the 
breadth of the G8’s overall agenda. In particular, the start of the post-cold-war-era saw 
the G8 expand its interest to include problems connected to economic development in 
the global South, and in the words of Alden, “In this setting, it did not take long for 
Africa’s state of perpetual crisis to be put on the West’s agenda” (Alden, 94, 95). The 
emergence of Western development assistance, economic and political values in Africa 
pre-dated China’s thrust into the continent by several decades, rendering the West’s 
unchallenged influence as the primary conduit guiding the continent’s path towards 
development1. African countries understand the nature and conditions of their 
relationships with OECD donor countries through decades of direct engagement and 
experience with them – an eye-opening experience highlighting the misalignment of the 
                                                        1 As will be mentioned in further detail in the following section, China was active in Africa between 1955 
and 1978 with an objective to secure diplomatic alliances with African governments.  
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West’s ideal expectation of constructive African development and the oft-negative 
reality produced by Western-led development policies.  
Heading the provision of development aid in Africa (but globally in general) for 
roughly three decades are the IMF and the World Bank. The two institutions were 
formed in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944 with the goal to build an 
international “framework for economic cooperation and development that would lead to 
a more stable and prosperous global economy” (IMF). On its website, the IMF states 
both its and the World Bank’s basic institutional functions, and are described as such: 
The IMF’s mandate: The IMF promotes international monetary 
cooperation and provides policy advice and technical assistance to help 
countries build and maintain strong economies. The IMF also makes 
loans and helps countries design policy programs to solve balance of 
payments problems when sufficient financing on affordable terms cannot 
be obtained to meet net international payments. IMF loans are short and 
medium term and funded mainly by the pool of quota contributions that 
its members provide. IMF are staff is primarily economists with wide 
experience in macroeconomic and financial policies. 
 
The World Bank’s mandate: The World Bank promotes long-term 
economic development and poverty reduction by providing technical and 
financial support to help countries reform particular sectors or implement 
specific projects—such as, building schools and health centers, providing 
water and electricity, fighting disease, and protecting the environment. 
World Bank assistance is generally long term and is funded both by 
member country contributions and through bond issuance. World Bank 
staff are often specialists in particular issues, sectors, or techniques 
(IMF). 
 
The IMF and the World Bank encapsulate Western foreign policy values and are tasked 
to prescribe these principles as non-negotiable conditions to recipient governments 
seeking to receive development aid through them. The set of policy principles are 
commonly referred to as “The Washington Consensus.” These policies aim to promote 
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basic Western neo-liberal economic values such as free trade, floating exchange rates, 
free markets and macroeconomic stability (Economics Help). To summarize the key 
Washington Consensus principles, John Williamson created a useful ten-point list of its 
recommendations in 1990:  
1. Low government borrowing. Avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to 
GDP; 
2. Redirection of public spending from subsidies (“especially 
indiscriminate subsidies”) toward broad-based provision of key pro-
growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care 
and infrastructure investment; 
3. Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax 
rates; 
4. Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in 
real term; 
5. Competitive exchange rates; 
6. Trade liberalization: liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis 
on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade 
protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs; 
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; 
8. Privatization of state enterprises; 
9. Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or 
restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental 
and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial 
institutions; 
10. Legal security for property rights (McKinnon, 7, 8). 
  From 1981 to 1999, these policies have been applied in the developing world via the 
World Bank-IMF’s application of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) under the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program (Alden, 96)(Seshamani, 2, 
3). SAPs required developing countries to adopt the Washington Consensus’s policy 
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recommendations as a pre-requisite to receive development aid, and in order to ensure 
continued access to aid funding, the IMF and World Bank then conducted regular 
evaluations to assess whether or not recipient governments implemented the policies to 
satisfactory standards and continued to meet established benchmarks (Seshamani, 8). 
Although SAP policy goals of eliminating market distortions, increasing FDI and 
reducing public expenditure on civil services to encourage privatization are meant to 
improve economic welfare, stability and growth, its application to 80 percent of the 
world’s population between 1980 and 1995 saw a marked increase in poverty levels in 
almost all developing countries (McKinnon, 10)(Seshamani, 2).  
SAP shortcomings carried over into the 1990s, inciting strong criticism and 
skepticism among African elites and citizens of the SAP’s failure to effect positive 
economic growth, increased FDI, increased social well-being, as well as of its 
prescriptive nature and its exclusive construction by World Bank-IMF; even consultants 
of the two institutions admitted to SAP failures due to its narrow focus “on short-term 
stabilization goals rather than long-term development and poverty reduction”2 (Alden, 
96)(McKinnon, 2). To further demonstrate it failures, African countries such as Sudan, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire), Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, Benin, 
Niger, and Algeria all experienced scathing public backlash in response to spikes in fuel 
prices, sharp currency devaluation resulting in price hikes of basic commodities such as 
food (McKinnon, 10). Although most African governments did and continue to desire 
the successful application of neo-liberal economic practices and good governance                                                         2 It is necessary to point out, as Chris Alden and Venkatesh Seshanmani have noted, that the success or 
failure of IMF and World Bank development programs such as SAPs is also dependent on the 
accountability of African government to uphold the policy recommendations and properly allocate aid 
funding towards their designed purposes (Alden, 96)(Seshamani, 9).    
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principles (namely, respect to democratic processes), the general experience of 
Western-led development in Africa is mired by severe complications with translating 
the economically sound neo-liberal policy recommendations into productive 
development schemes.  
As previously noted, these experiences have strained Western-African relations, 
and in the words of Alden, created a “near-universal displeasure, exhaustion and 
disappointment (if not outright hostility) that Africans feel towards” the West (Alden, 
19). The World Bank, IMF and OECD donor countries took these sentiments into 
account and made concrete efforts – notably an overhaul of the ESAF – to assuage the 
heaviest criticisms weighed against them. This resulted in the creation of the Poverty 
and Growth Facility (PRFG) and a more successful development approach using 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in place of SAPs beginning in September 
2000 (Elkins, Feeny, Prentice, 1). Nevertheless, African governments responded to their 
frustrating experiences with Western donors with intent to diversify their sources of 
development aid, FDI and trade partnerships. In turn, Africa began to look East in the 
mid to late-1990s, coincidentally aligning with China’s turn to Africa in its search of 
new sources of raw resources to sustain its booming domestic growth. Each presented to 
the other a mutually beneficial opportunity to ameliorate their respective developmental 
challenges. As will be reviewed and analyzed in the following sections, the stark 
contrast between China’s non-interventionist foreign policy principles and the West’s 
prescriptive Washington Consensus principles reeled in African governments, seeking 
an alternative to the Western vision of development.            
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Origin and Philosophy of China’s Foreign Policy Principles 
It is necessary to explain the origin and philosophy behind China’s current 
foreign policy principles, namely the principle of non-intervention, in order to 
demonstrate both China’s allure as an alternative source of development assistance in 
Africa, as well as to understand how non-intervention has led to international criticism 
over China’s role and influence (or lack thereof) in helping to resolve violent conflict 
where relevant in its African partnerships. It is also equally important to show how the 
inception of China’s foreign policy agenda created in-roads into Africa, which set the 
stage for China’s preliminary diplomatic engagements with Sudan.  
Overview of China’s Foreign Policy Principles and Their Appeal to Africa    
In order to understand the magnetic appeal pulling most African governments 
towards China as a source for development aid, trade relations and foreign direct 
investment, it is valuable to briefly review the historic roots of China’s current foreign 
policy principles. 
The foundation of China’s current foreign policy agenda dates back to the mid-
twentieth century. Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, Chairman Mao Zedong along with Premier Zhou Enlai formed and declared the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence during negotiations between China and India 
regarding their relations with Tibet between 31 December 1953 to 29 April 1954; to this 
day, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence (FPPC) continue to direct the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) conduct in its international relations (Alden, 
9)(FMPRC)(Principles of China’s Foreign Policy). The five principles are as follows: 
(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (2) mutual non-aggression (3) 
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non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs (4) equality and (5) peaceful co-
existence (Principles of China’s Foreign Policy). Straightforward and simple, these five 
principles support several general goals.  
First and foremost, the FPPC underscore China’s deep respect for national 
sovereignty and non-intervention. They assert China’s belief in the uninfringeable right 
of individual governments to govern as they see fit – without intrusive or uninvited 
meddling in internal affairs from the international community – in order to satisfy their 
political, social and economic agendas. China seeks neither to impose a specific 
development agenda on its African partners, nor intends to impose political or economic 
conditions to receive Chinese development assistance. China’s pledge to not interfere in 
the internal affairs of any foreign government guarantees that they will not impose 
Western-style economic or political conditions to receive aid3. As a result, the lack of 
conditions offers a comparatively simple means to receive development assistance. The 
appeal of this lack of complexity is well-illustrated by the head of Nigeria’s Investment 
Promotion Commissions, who once said, “The US will talk to you about governance, 
about efficiency, about security about the environment. The Chinese just ask: ‘How do 
we procure this license?’” (Alden, 103). Due to the lack of complexity, the reemergence 
of China in Africa presents a desired alternative to the West for securing development 
aid, access to capital, new sources of FDI and technology transfers, and offers China a 
needed source of primary resources as well as new markets which they can export 
manufactured goods and services to. African countries see China as an opportunity to                                                         3 Chinese aid is conditional only on the basis that its African partners officially recognize Beijing’s “One 
China” policy. As Yun Sun states, “For Beijing, it is a matter of fundamental regime legitimacy that 
Africa embraces the One China policy and accepts Beijing rather than Taipei as the only lawful 
representative of China” (Lammers)(Sun, 5). 
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form a strong South-South relationship and distance themselves from their neo-colonial 
North-South ties with Western countries (Lammers). As Alden notes, “the West’s 
employment of conditionalities…echoes the humiliations of the ‘unequal treaties’ 
foisted on China by the West in the nineteenth century. Indeed, China’s ability to 
recognize this is part of their genius of their foreign policy endeavors in Africa,” 
because it signifies a common, unfavorable experience with the West (Alden, 20). 
Furthermore, as former Chinese President Hu Jintao stated at the 5th summit of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China’s primary platform to engage the 
continent over matters concerning China-Africa cooperation and partnership, “China 
wholeheartedly and sincerely supports African countries to choose their own 
development path, and will wholeheartedly and sincerely support them to raise their 
development ability” (Alden, 30)(Blanchard). Although China and African countries are 
at different stages of development, this common experience and statements such as 
those of Hu’s gives hope that a Chinese partnership will be more sensitive and 
understanding of Africa’s development needs. In contrast to the West, China 
encourages its African partners to create development strategies that best suit their 
individual interests. 
Moreover, in connection with China’s lack of a particular prescriptive route 
towards development for Africa, Ellen Lammers indicates that when African 
governments look at China’s development path, they see that “400 million people were 
lifted out of poverty in two decades, without externally enforced structural adjustment 
programs,” which in turn “has bolstered African countries’ optimism that they too can 
devise their own development path” (Lammers). A specific example of this optimism is 
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illustrated by a recent statement from South African President Jacob Zuma during a 
2014 visit to Beijing. In an speech to students at Tsinghua University in Beijing, Zuma 
stated that “the emergence of China as a power among others offers an opportunity to 
African countries to be able to free themselves from the shackles that are really 
colonially designed;” that with “Europe in particular, you are regarded as either a 
former subject or a second and third class kind of person,” but “with China and African 
countries, particularly South Africa, [the relationship] is different” (African Journalism 
The World). Moreover, when South Africa, Africa’s only country with both a 
diversified economy and a legitimate democracy, entered the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) group of rising global economic powers, it asserted its aspiration to 
follow the Chinese and Brazilian example of state intervention in the economy 
(Govender & Herskotivz). Indeed, China’s own history of state-driven economic 
development reveals that the West’s hyper-focus on the private-sector for spurring 
development progress is not the only means to achieve economic growth and stability. 
Ultimately, this offers African countries an alternative, gives credence to the potential 
economic efficacy of Chinese-style development, challenges the Western model of 
development, and creates concern in the West that this could undermine its influence 
throughout the continent.     
Second, and specifically relevant today due to China’s recent emergence as a 
global economic superpower, is its commitment to peaceful co-existence and non-
aggression and aversion to using hard power (i.e. the use of military means or 
debilitating economic threats such as sanctions) to exert its will or influence over 
weaker governments. This commitment was reaffirmed this last December by current 
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Chinese President Xi Jinping in a keynote address to a Central Foreign Affairs Work 
Conference held by the CCP. He confirmed his and the CCP’s continued obligation to 
uphold a path of “peaceful development” – a decade-old termed coined by Hu Jintao 
during his “harmonious world” address at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the 
founding of the United Nations – pacifying international concern by asserting that 
China’s development will be achieved through peaceful means, while focusing on 
producing “win-win” results in its foreign partnerships (Johnson, CSIS)(Keyuan, 74). 
Concerning the use of economic sanctions as a diplomatic tool to punish and influence 
government behavior, China has a consistent record in opposition to their utilization. As 
foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu asserted, “We always believe that sanctions 
and pressure are not the way out” of diplomatic disputes and are not “conducive to 
diplomatic efforts” (Jacobs, NYT). Considering that the size China’s continually 
growing economy is second only to the United States, the ability to wield its economic 
or military might is a realistic concern for less powerful countries; thus, this policy goal 
provides assurance to less powerful countries that China is not, nor will ever be, an 
oppressive world power, but rather positions itself as a cooperative and humble partner.  
Third, the principles assert the CCP’s value of equality in its foreign 
partnerships, thus highlighting its commitment to upholding bilateral engagements with 
foreign governments that produce mutual benefit. In a report at the 18th Party Congress 
in 2012, Hu Jintao maintained: 
China is committed to growing friendship and cooperation in all fields 
with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. We will improve and grow our relations with developed 
countries by expanding areas of cooperation and properly addressing 
differences with them; and we will strive to establish a new type of 
relations of long-term stability and sound growth with other major 
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countries. We will continue to promote friendship and partnership with 
our neighbors, consolidate friendly relations and deepen mutually 
beneficial cooperation with them, and ensure that China's development 
will bring more benefits to our neighbors. We will increase unity and 
cooperation with other developing countries, work with them to uphold 
the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and support 
efforts to increase their representation and voice in international affairs. 
(Xinhuanet). 
This principle, bolstered by Hu’s publicly announced dedication to it, demonstrates 
Beijing’s intention to be a reliable, responsive and supportive partner in the 
international community. Affirming that a relationship with China is not a one-way 
street to exclusively serve its needs while undermining the goals of its partners, but 
rather, is a relationship in which China seeks to support and promote the diversified 
interests of fellow developing countries, is an especially attractive assurance among its 
South-South relations in Africa – the growth of China’s trade with Africa is a useful 
indicator of this attraction. China-African trade reached US$210.2 billion in 2015 – a 
2,000 time increase from its level in 1960 – which is up from US$198.5 in 2014, 
comprising 42% in exports to Africa and 58% in imports, and with a trade deficit of 
US$27.9 billion (FMPRC)(Sun, 7). In comparison, U.S. total trade with Africa in 2014 
was roughly 50% of China’s levels, amounting US$99.8 billion. In addition, China’s 
foreign direct investment in Africa has grown substantially, increasing from US$1.57 
billion in 2007 to over US$25 billion in 2015 (FMPRC)(Sun, 7). Statistics such as these 
indicate that China’s focus on mutually beneficial cooperation and its foreign policy of 
non-intervention is a winning feature of its engagement with Africa.     
African governments are disillusioned by the marked failure of the Western 
international–development complex – which dominate both supply to and conditions for 
developing countries to receive development assistance – to effect the positive growth 
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its policies aim to generate. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the values 
they promote are in stark contrast with the Washington Consensus principles that shape 
the domineering character of Western governments’ relations with developing countries 
in Africa and elsewhere. Put simply, China does not actively seek to reform the world in 
the image of its particular political or economic values, but instead endorses the 
absolute right of all nations to their national sovereignty; on the other side of the 
spectrum, Western nations are adamant about the promotion and adoption of their 
political, economic and social values by the international community, with the intention 
of creating international solidarity that uniformly aligns with Western values. Although 
there is no explicit intention to overtake the existing world order’s Westernized-frame, 
the transition of China from a developing nation to a powerful global force over the past 
several decades has inadvertently challenged the status quo of global power dynamics, 
which have historically represented and favored the position of the West in global 
affairs. What China does hope to do is to be a leading guide in international community 
towards the “democratization of international relations” and the adaptation of a multi-
value world system that recognizes more than a Western-conceptualized world order 
(Liao, 4, 5). Due to its continuous robust economic growth, China no longer resides in 
the periphery of the global community, but now undeniably occupies one of the driver 
seats within it, placing it in a position to promote this ideal on the world stage.  
This new reality has stimulated anxiety and dialogue among Western nations 
about the form China’s international role and global influence will take. Perhaps more 
effectively illustrated than any other context, the West’s apprehension is beautifully 
exemplified in its reaction towards China’s swift entrenchment in the African continent 
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over the course of the past two decades. As Alden points out, China’s undeniable rise in 
Africa has troubled the West, casting doubts over the efficacy of its “campaign to 
systematically restructure the economic and political life of the continent,” as well as its 
ability to help build “successful market economies within the framework of a liberal 
constitutional state within Africa” (Alden, 102, 104). China’s continually growing 
presence in and relationship with Africa is intimately tied to what separates them from 
the West: that is, its markedly different philosophy towards foreign policy and the 
tangible advantages it produces in practice.  
But it is foolhardy to declare China and its foreign policies as a faultless 
counter-point to Western development policies. While the attraction of the FPPC in 
Africa is undeniable, specifically the non-intervention principle, the criticisms targeted 
at it are equally undeniable. In upholding its fidelity to the FPPC, China and its non-
intervention principle have come under fire from some in Africa, but even more from 
the greater international community. Of especial note is for not upholding ideals such as 
good governance, human rights, or environmental protection in its Chinese-African 
partnerships. China also has no qualms concerning who or what type of government it 
forms bonds with – be it democratic South Africa or autocratic Sudan. China’s 
indiscriminate approach to who it decides to engage with has led some, such as 
respected Western foreign policy analyst Robert Kagan, to go as far as to declare that 
China is forming “an informal league of dictators” in Africa (Alden, 105). But one of 
the heaviest criticisms weighed against China’s non-interventionist stance in foreign 
affairs – and the focus of this thesis – is the justification that non-intervention has 
allowed China to sidestep its role in upholding peace and security in situations where 
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violent conflict arises in the places it does business. China’s close relationship with 
Sudan highlights this particular criticism better than any other case. China’s relationship 
with conflict-ridden Sudan has been the source of abundant academic and international 
debate over the role China’s non-intervention policy plays in conflict situations. Its 
strict adherence to non-intervention during the initial stages of the Darfur Crisis 
revealed the sheer difficulty, if not impossibility, of maintaining its “business is 
business” stance, and preserving the economic purity of its Sino-Sudanese relationship 
from political spoilage. China’s internationally contentious relationship with one of 
Africa’s most renowned pariah regimes became the target of severe Western 
condemnation as the Darfur Conflict intensified – and as it intensified, so did the threat 
to China’s substantial investments in the region.        
As will soon be examined, China responded to the threats to its economic 
investments and international reputation by adjusting its position on its non-intervention 
policy. But first, it is time to turn to how the inception of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-Existence coincided with its earliest official diplomatic ties in Africa, which set the 
foundation for the future of Sino-Sudanese relations.                                        
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Chapter 2: A Comparison China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa: 
The Context of Sudan and South Sudan 
History of China’s Initial Interaction with Africa and Formal Ties to Sudan 
 
Following the end of World War II, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
Existence were born in support of the fledgling CCP’s volition to assert itself as the 
international community’s lead developing nation. This desire is manifest in Mao’s 
“Three Worlds” policy, in which he conceptualized a global hierarchy where “the 
United States and the Soviet Union belong to the first world. The in-between Japan, 
Europe and Canada belong to the second world…[and] except for Japan, Asia belongs 
to the third world. So does the whole of Africa and South America” (FMPRC). Viewing 
itself at this time as a third world country, China claimed to support all second and third 
world countries against first world hegemony, as well as any interference with the 
former two worlds’ national sovereignty (FMPRC). Thus, in a world dominated by 
American imperialism, Soviet Union communism, and European colonialism, China 
adamantly sought to form alliances with young, sovereign developing nations which 
had not yet been drawn in under the umbrella of American or Soviet influence, and 
which had also been subjected the degrading experience of colonial rule (Alden, 
10)(Sun, 4, 11). With this in mind, there is little surprise that Beijing extended its hand 
to newly independent African countries, marking its first significant foray into the 
continent.  
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The new partnerships were both logical and mutually beneficial. Motivated by 
ideological and political concerns at this time, China seized the opportunity in its 
pursuit of new alliances to direct its foreign policy in a manner that satisfied these two 
interests: namely, in regard to the former, with the aim to form reliable, like-minded 
diplomatic relations in order to secure its then-fragile global position in light of 
international isolation from the United States and the Soviet Union; then, similarly, in 
regard to the latter, with the aim to bond over shared colonial experiences, unify against 
US-Soviet antagonism, and ultimately bolster the political legitimacy of the CCP (Yun 
Sun, 3, 4 11). As a result, China formed its first six diplomatic relationships with 
African countries at the Bandung Conference in 1955; the new partnerships comprised 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya and Sudan (Yun Sun, 3).  
From this point until 1979, African partners benefitted from substantial flows of 
aid until the CCP shifted its focus towards its own domestic development needs, 
consequently placing the stream of aid on more than a decade-long hiatus (Alden, 9, 
10). Despite the halt of aid, Beijing’s support led to a major increase in the number of 
Sino-African relationships. By the mid-1980s, the Chinese government formed ties with 
44 African nations, which served to “strengthen the political legitimacy of the 
communist regime” as well as garner “diplomatic support and cooperation from African 
countries on key issues in the international arena and at multi-lateral forums” (Yun Sun, 
4).  
With particular regard to support on the international arena, friendly Sino-
African diplomatic relations have been critically supportive in promoting the CCP’s 
political goals. For example, China often relies on African countries (54 African nations 
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currently comprise more than 25% of U.N. member states and votes) to support its 
agenda at the U.N.; it recognized early on the power of these partnerships, when 
African votes helped place China back into its permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), despite international opposition led by the United States to 
exclude it (Yun Sun, 4). Therefore, even though Sino-African activity took a pause 
following Beijing’s concerted efforts to build meaningful diplomatic ties throughout 
Africa between the mid-1950s and late-1970s, its support in Africa was by no means 
forgotten as its reengagement in the 1990s would demonstrate. After all, China too is a 
developing country – but unlike others, it was and continues to be uniquely tasked to 
support the world’s largest domestic population. Above all else, it was confronted with 
the need to develop in order to support Chinese citizens and the CCP’s domestic 
ambitions. In turn, its focus on domestic growth aimed and achieved to cement and raise 
China’s stature on the international level.  
So, when Deng Xiaoping assumed the presidency of the CCP in 1978, he “set 
China on a gradualist road of capitalist-oriented development that produced three 
decades of nearly double-digit growth and a rise in living standards that has brought a 
nine-fold increase in per capita income to US$1,700 in 2005” (Alden, 10). Deng’s 
relationship with the United States, his decision to open up China to foreign direct 
investment, and on a more fundamental level adopt a capitalist style economy (or in the 
words of the CCP, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”), all served to spur China’s 
massive growth (Alden, 10). Yet despite the economic surge, Deng declared an 
influential caution concerning the role China’s foreign policy should play during the 
nation’s transition: “Observe calmly, secure our position. Hide our capabilities and bide 
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our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, never claim leadership” (Alden, 11). His 
advice has continued to influence Chinese foreign policy, with Beijing only recently 
realizing in its Sino-Sudanese partnership the difficulty in maintaining a low-profile 
considering its current status as a global economic superpower, especially where violent 
civil conflict plays a role in its African partnerships (e.g. Darfur in Sudan). But 
nonetheless, it inspired and helped to maintain the powerful pace of China’s domestic 
growth from the early-1990s onward, especially under international punishment and 
neglect that the Chinese government received in the fallout from Tiananmen (Alden, 
11). So in order to accommodate its fast-paced growth during the 1990s, China was 
immediately pressed to find a solution to a fundamental problem that strikes at the heart 
of modern economics: for China to satisfy the demands of its domestic growth, it had to 
break with its cornerstone policy of self-sufficiency, and fill the quickly emerging 
supply gaps “in a host of areas vital to development such as energy, strategic minerals, 
forestry resources and even food production” to maintain its trajectory (Alden, 11). 
Without a sufficient supply of raw materials within its borders or support from 
developed Western countries, Beijing needed to draw from a new source; after more 
than a decade of neglect, Africa reemerged from the periphery of the CCPs international 
agenda, which proved ready and willing to receive its out-of-touch partner from the East 
once again.  
Building of Sino-Sudanese Relations 
Formal ties with Sudan began to strengthen immediately following China’s 
reemergence on the African continent. As noted earlier, Sudan was among the first six 
countries to recognize the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the 
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Bandung Conference in 1955, making it one of China’s most long-standing 
relationships in Africa. Considering this, it makes sense that Sudan was one of the first 
countries that China reached out to in the early 1990s when it set its sights on the 
continent to secure its domestic demand for new energy sources – namely crude oil. 
China’s energy needs were great and continue to be so. For example, with China’s 
annual economic growth rate averaging 10% throughout the past three decades, it 
became a net importer of oil in 1993, is currently the second largest global oil consumer 
but is projected to supersede the US by 2030s, and is expected to import more than 66% 
of its total oil by 2020, up to 72% by 2040 (Alessi & Xu, CFR).  
These statistics spell out China’s dire demand to prioritize energy security, 
particularly during the 1990s when both countries faced economic sanctions from the 
West: the former for its collusion in an assassination attempt on then Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak, human rights abuses during the North-South civil war (1983-2005), 
and support of international terrorist groups; for the latter, sanctions tailed the events at 
Tiananmen Square; thus, a mutually beneficial opportunity opened for both countries to 
strengthen ties with each other and create investment opportunities (Nastios, 62, 64). In 
light of their long-standing history with one another, China’s non-intervention policy, 
Sudan’s substantial sources of untapped crude, China’s potential as a new oil market, 
provider of development finances, investor in Sudanese weapons manufacturing 
facilities and supplier of armaments, they viewed each other as a strategic long-term 
investment opportunities (Large, 615)(Nastios, 62). So, in 1995 Sudanese President 
Omar Al-Bashir paid a visit to Beijing to sign arms sales deals and formalize contracts 
for China to explore and help develop Sudanese oil fields.  
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These contracts resulted in China building one of two oil refineries in northern 
Sudan, a joint venture in 1997 to set up the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
(GNPOC) with investments deriving from the Chinese National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC) (40% stake), Petronas (Malaysian, 30%), Talisman (25%) and the newly 
established Sudan Petroleum Company (Sudapet, 5%)4, and the building of a 1,506 km 
oil pipeline 1999, connecting the Heglig Oilfield to Port Sudan, which enabled Sudan to 
source its crude oil into international markets (Liao, 6)(Nastios, 62)(Olimat, 2). 
                                                        
4 Along with its 40% stake in GNPOC, which operates oil blocks 1, 2 and 4, the CNCP would also grab a 
41% share in oil exploration and production consortium Petrodar. Through this investment, it gained 
rights to operate in Blocks 3 and 7 which started in April 2006, Block 6 (of which it has a 95% share), the 
partly deepwater Block 15, followed by a 40% share of offshore Block 13 (Large, 616).    
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As a result of these contracts, Chinese investment in Sudan boomed. It has 
invested over US$15 billion in the region, with most investments directed towards 
building infrastructure needed to support oil extraction. In effect, this boosted Sino-
Sudanese bi-lateral trade from US$890 million in 2000 to US$3.9 billion in 2005, 
followed by an increase to an average of US$6.4 billion between 2006-2010, 
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constituting 7% of total Sino-African trade, ultimately making Sudan China’s third 
largest trading partner on the continent (Alden, 61)(FOCAC)(Large, 616). As Large 
indicates, Sudan served as a “model site of engagement in Africa” preceding its 
spreading out across the continent to formalize more Sino-African relationships in order 
to satiate its energy-security needs, as well as create deeper inroads to secure other 
economic and resource extraction opportunities in the 2000s (Large, 615). Considering 
the high demand placed on the CCP to tap into new resource markets, heavy investment 
in longtime ally Sudan proved to be a strategic and beneficial business move on China’s 
behalf, and equally so for internationally isolated Sudan. China’s willingness to engage 
Sudan while the rest of the world neglected the pariah state rests on the shoulders of its 
non-intervention policy. It provided Beijing a rationale to work with the Sudanese 
government in Khartoum – despite its global ostracization and deplorable reputation – 
on the basis that Khartoum’s actions, no matter how controversial, are within its 
sovereign rights and therefore should be respected by external governments on those 
grounds. Sino-Sudanese relations were to be based on an economics-first approach, a 
characteristic stance deriving from the FPPC’s values. But shortly following the turn of 
the century China soon realized that its ideological “business is business” approach 
would be jeopardized by the socio-political reality of civil conflict in Sudan following 
the outbreak of the Darfur Crisis in 2003.  
Case Study: China’s Non-Intervention Policy in the Context of Sudanese Conflict 
China’s reluctance to insert itself as a conflict mediator in Darfur Crisis was 
drawn under the international spotlight once it was widely understood throughout the 
world that its investments in the Sudanese oil industry were being used to propel 
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Khartoum’s brutal suppression of its own people. Oil revenues generated by the 
Sudanese government’s sales to China allowed it to purchase both Chinese weaponry, 
and with the assistance of Chinese companies, develop three manufacturing facilities 
that would produce light arms such as machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars, anti-
tank weapons and ammunition (Human Rights First). In fact, US$500 million in oil 
export revenues permitted Khartoum to allocate 80% of those funds towards the 
purchase of Chinese weapons in 1999. Moreover, Sudan’s small arms imports saw a 
680-fold increase by 2005 from its level in 1999, and data from U.N. and Sudanese 
sources revealed that China sold over US$3 million in small arms to Al-Bashir’s 
government, which rocketed to over US$55 million by 2006 (Herbst, Bloomberg)(Liao, 
7)(Human Rights First). Also, despite a UNSC imposed arms embargo in 2004 (that 
China endorsed), Khartoum continued for several years to consistently purchase 90% of 
its small arms from Chinese suppliers (Human Rights First). This reciprocal arms-for-
oil deal was a catalyst that escalated the violence perpetrated by the Sudanese 
government against the two Darfurian rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). But in the early years of the 
crisis China maintained intimate proximity to its non-intervention principle. In the face 
of rising global interest for external intervention to subdue and end Al-Bashir’s state-led 
violence in the Darfur region, China shielded itself with its non-interventionist 
philosophy to keep its distance from assuming a direct role in conflict resolution and 
mediation.  
While China rested in philosophical inertia anchored by its foreign policy 
principles, the rest of the world reacted with vim. Intergovernmental organizations 
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including the U.N., the AU and the Arab League became deeply engaged between 2003 
and 2007 in formulating a coherent strategic response in order to put an end to spiraling 
atrocities committed in Darfur Crisis; a handful of their resolutions drawn up during this 
period were significantly thinned down due to China’s insistence “on its commitment to 
non-intervention, military or otherwise, and maintained that economic sanctions should 
not be imposed…and that UN-AU peacekeeping forces should not be deployed” 
without official Sudanese consent (Olimat, 4). China’s resistance to the proposed 
measures can be linked to two factors: one, to preserve of its ideological devotion to 
non-intervention, and two, to protect the sustained activity of its oil operations that the 
proposed economic sanctions would hamper. Its self-interest took precedence over the 
interests of external forces calling on China to exert its diplomatic influence over Sudan 
to end the conflict.  
But its seemingly unshakeable stance on its non-intervention principle would 
soon falter in late 2006/early 2007 when faced with two greater threats to its self-
interest, which ultimately pushed Beijing to take assertive diplomatic action 
incongruent with its non-intervention principle. The two threats included the direct 
physical threat the conflict placed on China’s oil investments, but even more influential 
in inducing its policy shift was the unavoidable mountain of global criticism led by the 
West that targeted China’s inaction, placing its international reputation at severe risk. 
China’s ability to keep its economic relationship with Khartoum separate from its 
internal political affairs was compromised; its ability to turn a blind eye to mounting 
global condemnation of its internationally perceived complicity in fueling the Darfur 
Crisis would soon be compromised as well.  
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Challenges to Non-Intervention: Threatened Investments and International Criticism 
The vulnerability of China’s oil investments to harm from Darfurian rebel 
groups is a key dynamic that forced China to join the international community and take 
an assertive diplomatic role to help resolve the Darfur Crisis. China’s investments now 
threatened China’s ability to effectively maintain its non-interventionist position in two 
particular circumstances. The first was when the rebel JEM movement intentionally 
targeted and attacked Chinese oil operations in Defra, Kordofan in October 2007, 
followed by an explicit demand that China entirely withdraw its presence from Sudan; 
the second occurred one year later when nine CNPC employees were taken hostage in 
southern Kordofan, and resulted in the death of five of the nine workers (Large, 10). 
The unfortunate casualties in particular required China to reassess its tightly held 
position of strict non-intervention in the turbulent internal affairs of Sudan. Beijing 
knew that taking action to enhance the protection of its Chinese citizens working in 
Sudanese oil fields, as well as the oil-related infrastructure projects it invested billions 
to develop, was pragmatic. 
    But even more influential in causing China to alter its position on non-
intervention in the Darfur Crisis was the booming voice of international public opinion 
about Beijing’s inaction and refusal to act as a responsible stakeholder in Sudan. The 
idea of being a responsible stakeholder originated in 2001 from a report by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) titled The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P): it proposed that state sovereignty not only meant the 
right to direct one’s domestic affairs, but also entailed a responsibility to protect its 
citizens. The report asserted that a government’s failure to uphold the latter 
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responsibility issued legitimate grounds for external international intervention to fulfill 
this responsibility (UN). In 2004, the U.N. adopted this “emerging norm” into a highly 
influential, Chinese-backed report called A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility (Pang, 241). Yet despite its stated support of the report and the 
responsibility it called for, China, as its aforementioned resistance to full-
implementation of U.N. sanctions over Sudan supports, would prove reluctant to act in 
accordance with it during the initial years of the Darfur Crisis. As a result of its loyalty 
to the FCCP, global judgment of China’s failure to act as a responsible stakeholder in 
Sudan came to a head in the year leading up to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.  
To the CCP, the games were to be a fundamental moment in to showcase the 
fruits of its incredible economic development to the world; a special chance to replace 
the bitter memory of Tiananmen with a brilliant image that underscores China’s 
remarkable progress, China’s steadfast determination to be recognized as an emerging 
competitive top-tier global player, China’s transformation from its damaged 
international reputation in the 1990s to a positive global force (Olimat, 2). But its 
unique chance was stained by the world’s crusade to hold China accountable for its 
complicity in stoking the vicious atrocities of the 21st century’s worst humanitarian 
crisis. A 150-strong global league of human rights organizations formed the Save 
Darfur Coalition, and in concert with the United Nations, United States, the European 
Union as well as the African Union, they waged a relentless assault on China, 
lambasting the country for its “immorality, self-centeredness, and [role] as a shepherd 
of genocide” (Olimat, 5). This broad international coalition further increased its 
pressure on Beijing to act and called for a boycott of the Olympic Games, smearing the 
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event with a new ugly title: the 2008 Beijing “Genocide Games” (Olimat, 5). But the 
weight of the world’s cutting criticism on Beijing fell harder still. More than 100 
members of the U.S. Congress wrote personal letters to former Chinese President Hu 
Jintao in a determined effort to convince him to end Sino-Sudanese commercial 
relations, and to take swift and diligent action to extinguish the Darfur Crisis; if the 
CCP chose to ignore this call to action, Sean McCormack of the U.S. Department of 
State captured the world’s consensus when he stated, “History will judge your 
government as having bankrolled a genocide” (Nastios, 63). The Chinese government’s 
aspiration to use the Olympic Games to dazzle the world with its progress as an 
emerging international power was all but shot; the only way to rectify Western attacks 
against its global reputation was to recognize the damaging position its foreign policy 
principles put it in.  
The impossibility to prevent its economic investments from weaving into the 
socio-political reality of violent conflict within the borders of their oldest African ally 
became blatantly apparent. This conflicting reality prompted Beijing to make a choice: 
either hold firm to its strict practice of non-intervention in foreign affairs and drown in 
the memory being shaped for its role in “bankrolling a genocide”, or heed the West’s 
call for China to rally with the global coalition against Al-Bashir’s government and 
assert the power of its diplomatic influence over him. As will be seen, Beijing made the 
wise decision to commit itself to uphold peace and security efforts in the Darfur Crisis. 
China would take up its global responsibility to be a responsible stakeholder, and 
assumed a constructive role in the international conflict mediation efforts that would 
soon follow in Sudan. The pliability of China’s foreign policy principles had been 
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tested. The year 2007 marked a crucial turning point in China’s role in the crisis, and 
elucidated an adjustment – but to be sure, not reversal – from passive to assertive 
Chinese diplomacy.   
China’s Assertive Diplomatic Role in the Darfur Crisis 
Before examining China’s new engaged role in the Darfur Crisis in 2007, it is 
important to distinguish that China’s switch from passive to assertive diplomacy with 
the Sudanese government represented a small, yet palpable, adjusted stance toward its 
foreign policy of non-intervention, rather than a radical departure from it. It is indeed 
accurate to describe the CCP’s swift switch from a passive support role of the greater 
international community’s direct mediation efforts in Sudan to an engaged lead role as 
uncharacteristic diplomatic behavior – perhaps even incongruous with its previous strict 
adherence its non-intervention principle. But, it is inaccurate and overblown to perceive 
this switch as a significant contradiction of its non-intervention policy; official 
government statements and concrete actions reveal the erroneousness of such an 
extreme perception.  
To demonstrate the degree of its adjustment, it is useful to look at China’s 
response to the previously discussed U.N. adoption of R2P into the institution’s general 
global agenda in 2004, in which it declared its official opinion of R2P in its “Position 
Paper on the United Nations Reforms” in 2005: 
Each state shoulders the primary responsibility to protect its own 
population. However, internal unrest in a country is often caused by 
complex factors. Prudence is called for in judging a government’s ability 
and will to protect its citizens. No reckless intervention should be 
allowed. When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate 
concern of the international community to ease and defuse the crisis. 
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Any response to such a crisis should strictly conform to the UN Charter 
and the opinions of the country and the regional organization concerned 
should be respected. It falls on the Security Council to make the decision 
in the frame of the UN in light of specific circumstances which should 
lead to a peaceful solution as far as possible. Wherever it involves 
enforcement actions, there should be more prudence in the consideration 
of each case (Pang, 240, 241). 
Particularly important here in relation to China’s respect of non-intervention in foreign 
affairs is the statement that, “When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs…Any 
response to such a crisis should strictly conform to the U.N. Charter and the opinions of 
the country and the regional organization concerned should be respected.” This line of 
thought certainly conforms to the diplomatic philosophy that characterizes China’s non-
intervention principle: for external intervention into a sovereign state to resolve a 
“massive humanitarian crisis” to be permitted, the international community is, as a 
prerequisite, required to secure the explicit consent from the state, the corresponding 
regional organization, and the U.N.. If any one of the three denies consent, international 
intervention by would be deemed illegitimate, and therefore prohibited. China’s official 
statement concedes that international intervention to defuse humanitarian conflicts can 
be justified for exceptional cases, and can be viewed as inconsistent with strict 
adherence to the non-interference principle. But first and foremost, this tripartite 
checks-and-balances consent mechanism prioritizes and protects the right of any 
sovereign state to allow or deny external intervention into its internal affairs; therefore, 
China’s official stance on R2P syncs with the philosophy that underlies the non-
intervention principle. While the Darfur Crisis compromised China’s ability to keep its 
business interests separate from Sudanese civil conflict, and thus compromised its hard 
stance on non-intervention in order to protect its self-interest, it is worth noting that 
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China, at no point during the crisis, imposed political or economic conditions on its 
relationship with the Sudanese government as punishment for its state-led violence in 
Darfur. This fact further underscores why in China’s assumption of an active and 
assertive diplomatic role in 2007 represents an adjustment – not abandonment – of its 
non-intervention policy.  
While official political rhetoric is not always in alignment with political action, 
it is now time to examine the CCP’s diplomatic tactics to open up the Darfur region to a 
UN-AU peacekeeping force, and then evaluate its consistency with China’s official 
statements about R2P in order to reinforce the policy adjustment versus policy 
abandonment notion. Furthermore, this evaluation intends to serve as a basis to contrast 
recent Chinese diplomatic action in response to South Sudan’s current socio-political 
conflict, revealing an increasingly proactive and pronounced assertiveness in its 
mediation efforts than those in the case of Sudan.                         
China responded to the world’s uniform criticism by positioning itself as an 
effective conflict mediator within the international coalition, and would play an 
essential role in overcoming Al-Bashir’s staunch reluctance to external intervention into 
the Darfur region. While it is true that Wang Guangya, Chinese Ambassador to the UN, 
played a meaningful role in a 2006 UN-AU peace conference that ultimately produced a 
plan to implement a 25,000 strong joint UN-AU peacekeeping force to resolve the 
crisis, China had, as mentioned in a previous section, expressed its disapproval of 
military intervention without Sudanese consent; as a result, it withheld further direct 
assistance on the grounds of its non-intervention policy (Nastios, 65)(Olimat, 4)(Pang, 
241). It was not until 2007, during the peak of the detrimental clamor shrouding the 
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2008 Beijing Olympics, that China noticeably adjusted its non-interventionist stance. 
This shift is displayed by several visible concrete actions that China took, which 
demonstrated its serious commitment to its new diplomatic role in the crisis.  
One, the immediate creation of a Special Chinese Envoy to Africa, headed by 
diplomat and former South African/Zimbabwean ambassador Lieu Guijin, to address 
the Darfur Crisis indicated to Andrew Nastios, U.S. diplomat and leader of President 
Bush’s Special Envoy to Sudan, that the “very existence of a Chinese special envoy” 
signaled “a more aggressive diplomatic role for China” in Sudan (Nastios, 65)(Olimat, 
5). Two, Beijing now chose to leverage its close relationship with the Khartoum regime 
to the collective benefit of the international coalition’s diplomatic efforts. China focused 
its diplomacy towards the Sudanese government and called on other external powers to 
engage the rebel groups. Despite privately expressed interest by some rebel factions to 
negotiate with China, the perception of China being a “key patron” the Sudanese 
government hindered its position to engage non-government actors in the conflict 
(Large, 39, 40). Although Beijing’s authority held minimal sway over the rebel groups, 
it proved the power of its diplomatic influence over the Khartoum regime. Al-Bashir’s 
staunch resistance to external international intervention in Darfur was explicit: he cited 
rights to the respect and protection of state sovereignty, claiming that a UN-AU 
peacekeeping violated it, and went further by affirming that “no blue helmeted (UN) 
peacekeeping force would ever set foot in Darfur” (Nastios, 65). But in February 2007, 
Hu Jintao paid a visit to Sudan to meet with Al-Bashir in order deliver a terse message: 
“Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve this problem” (Liao, 8). On the heels 
of this visit, Hu, at the behest of US President George Bush, made a direct call to Al-
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Bashir to further persuade him to accept the proposed peacekeeping force to enter 
Darfur; ultimately, he gave into to Hu’s persuasion, and subsequently gave way to the 
United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which included the 
largest peacekeeping force in UN history, leading Nastios to believe that “while many 
countries pushed Sudan to accept the troops…I believe it was Hu Jintao’s call that 
changed Bashir’s mind” (Nastios, 65). Surely, deliberate efforts such as the spontaneous 
creation of a Special Chinese Envoy to Africa, as well as the direct active engagement 
of top Chinese political elites with their Sudanese counterparts (such as Hu’s personal 
discussions with Al-Bashir), was a marked departure from its accustomed hallmark of 
reserved diplomacy in conflict mediation – an undeniable adjustment of its non-
intervention policy.  
But at the same time, and with greater significance, the Chinese government’s 
strategic approach rested in fidelity with the core value of this very principle. China’s 
engaged diplomatic efforts to persuade the Sudanese government to permit UNAMID’s 
peacekeeping force into Darfur complied with the Chinese-backed tripartite consent 
mechanism. Its pressure on Sudan to allow international interference in its internal 
affairs equally balanced with its respect to prevent said interference in the name of 
Sudan’s state sovereignty. Through tough negotiation alone, China’s concerted 
diplomacy managed to extract Al-Bashir’s hard-earned consent, and opened the Darfur 
region up to international intervention to provide humanitarian relief. To protect its 
economic investments in Sudan, its questioned reputation as a responsible stakeholder 
by Africa as well as the international community, and its attempt to redefine its global 
image as a cooperative emerging economic superpower, its role in the Darfur Crisis 
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reveals that China, in response to the consequences produced by unintended 
interlocking of its economic relationship with Sudan’s socio-political  conflict, was 
willing to shift its position on the foundational foreign policy principle that has directed 
its conduct in foreign affairs since the mid-20th century in order to adapt to the 
complexities posed by civil conflict, and thus better protect its varied foreign and 
domestic interests. 
Case Study: China’s Non-Intervention Policy in the Context of South Sudanese 
Conflict 
In the years following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Hu led China to 
prioritize its commitment to uphold peace and security in Africa in the CCP’s foreign 
policy agenda for the continent. Evidence of this change is clearly illustrated in the 
Beijing Action Plan for the 5th ministerial FOCAC agenda in 2012. It includes a full 
section titled “Cooperation in the Fields of Peace and Security” in which it spells out – 
albeit without much detail – China’s invigorated pledge to enhance this aspect of its 
relationship with the continent. To give examples of the key issues raised, the agenda 
states that Beijing intends to up its “commitment to strengthen cooperation in policy 
coordination, capacity building, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations and 
post-conflict reconstruction,” as well as increase “exchanges and cooperation between 
the United Nations in playing a constructive role in helping resolve the conflicts in 
Africa…[and] take an active part in peacekeeping missions” (FOCAC). More specific 
pledges confirm China’s decision to implement what it calls the “Initiative on China-
Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security,” which aims to facilitate 
“financial and technical support” to AU “peace-support operations, the development of 
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the African Peace and Security Architecture, personnel exchanges and training in the 
field of peace and security” (FOCAC). As can be seen, the lessons learned from 
Beijing’s initially minute role, followed by its direct diplomatic involvement during the 
later years of the Darfur Crisis, have forced China to recognize the necessity to include 
this in its game plan for the continent. Turning now to its current role in the on-going 
civil conflict in South Sudan, it is clear that China not only upholds an equivalent level 
of assertive diplomacy as was seen in the case study of Sudan, but has in fact 
progressed certain aspects of its active peacekeeping role, further testing the boundaries 
of its once sacrosanct non-intervention policy. 
Brief Overview of South Sudan’s Independence and Descent into Civil Conflict 
As guaranteed by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which 
formally ended the North-South conflict preceding the Darfur Crisis, South Sudan 
earned its independence from Sudan in July 2011 (Nastios, 65, 66). Following its 
independence, the UN initiated the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
July 8th, 2011 with the assignment to assist in “peace building, state-building and 
[strengthening] the extension of state authority” (UN). The official division of Sudan 
resulted in South Sudan’s acquisition of 75% of Sudan’s former oil facilities, thus 
drastically changing the composition of their respective economies (Olimat, 7). Current 
statistics reveal the magnitude  of this shift: Sudan’s fiscal revenues nosedived by 55%, 
foreign exchange earnings plummeted by two-thirds of its former level, export revenues 
followed in suit, dropping from US$11 billion in 2010 to US$1.8 billion in 2012, 
ultimately leading oil to now only account for 27% of total GDP compared to 60% in 
2009 (EIA). In stark contrast, oil revenues currently account for 98% of South Sudan’s 
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total GDP (EIA). Considering China’s considerable financial stake in Sudan’s former 
oil sector, establishing good relations with the fledgling South Sudanese government 
became an imperative. Following the ratification of the CPA the CCP acted quickly by 
opening a consulate, offering loans, formalizing business contracts for direct investment 
in the south and strengthening diplomatic relations by meeting with new southern 
leaders (Nastios, 65). Sudan and South Sudan both rely on Chinese imports for oil 
revenue, as China accounts for 86% of their total exports (EIA). 
           
               
So, when violence broke out on December 15th, 2013 in South Sudan’s capital Juba 
following President Salva Kirr’s accusations of Vice President Riek Machar’s 
subversive intention to stage a coup to overthrow him, the civil war “took on an 
ethnic/tribal dimension, with soldiers, police officers and civilians fighting each other;” 
and once again, China was prompted to intervene in order to protect its interests in the 
face of yet another Sudanese internal conflict (UN)(Wagner, Huffington Post). By 
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comparing and contrasting China’s role in resolving the new conflict against its post-
2007 role in the Darfur Crisis, it becomes clear that China not only continues to practice 
its new approach of assertive hands-on diplomacy, but has further pushed the 
boundaries of its non-intervention policy in several ways, which will now be evaluated 
in a point-by-point examination. 
Increased UN Peacekeeping Involvement 
China’s participation and contribution to UN peacekeeping missions has seen a 
noteworthy increase since the previous decade. Although it is only the 14th largest 
contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, a comparison of contributions on behalf of 
the five members of the UNSC in 2015 reveal China’s supremacy in this regard: Russia 
currently offers 91 troops, followed by the US’s 95, the UK’s 288, France’s 924, 
leaving China in a clear lead at 2,899, up from 2,192 in 2014 (Tiezzi, The 
Diplomat)(UN). As of last year, 1,984 of China’s contribution were security forces, an 
impressive number considering that it only started to include troops on UN 
peacekeeping missions in the summer of 2013 (Tiezzi, The Diplomat). Furthermore, 
while China contributed only a 315-member engineering unit to UNAMID, its initial 
deployment to UNMISS was 350, and as of this year, for the first time in its history, it 
deployed an additional full battalion of 700 combat troops, marking UNMISS China’s 
largest contribution to UN peacekeeping missions around the world, with the remaining 
majority also placed in other missions in Africa (Tiezzi, The Diplomat)(McGiffert, 37). 
Although criticisms have been raised that China’s new battalion is in South Sudan only 
“to ensure the safety of its workers and assets in Africa and guarantee a steady flow of 
energy for domestic consumption,” as a recent Wall Street Journal report states, this 
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claim falls apart when placed under scrutiny, for a map charting UNMISS peacekeeping 
deployment reveals that Chinese peacekeepers “are now concentrated not in oil-rich 
states, but in Wau of Western Bahr el Gazel state” (Jamestown)(Tiezzi, The Diplomat). 
Steps such as these bolster China’s global credibility when it states that it is now 
assuming the proper role of a responsible stakeholder in global affairs, and its increased 
presence in UN peacekeeping missions to uphold peace and security on the African 
continent is a useful indicator of its good faith to this commitment.         
Chinese-South Sudanese Arms Deals 
In a departure from the Sudan case, China has taken a hard stance against the 
sale of arms to South Sudan’s government. Although US$38 million weapons 
transaction that included ammunition, grenade launchers, machine guns and missiles 
was completed between China North Industries Corporation (known as Norinco) with 
the South Sudanese government in June 2014, Lan Kun, an attache at the Chinese 
Embassy in Juba, indicated that the CCP deemed it “inappropriate to implement” the 
remainder of the contract upon learning about the details of the order (Bloomberg). 
Furthermore, Lan insisted that, “No more weapons are heading to South Sudan…There 
are some media reports that were alleging that the Chinese government was behind this 
business operation and wants to undermine this peace process. That is totally untrue,” 
and in fact, China’s government “has asked all relevant Chinese companies to stop the 
weapons trade to South Sudan and that this stance of the government has not changed” 
(Bloomberg). Beijing’s new attitude stands in stark contrast to its defensive viewpoint 
on arms transactions with Al-Bashir’s government. Then Special Envoy to Africa Lieu 
Guijin stated, “China had no control over the destination or the use of its weapons,” 
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deflecting criticism by pointing out that Iran, Russia, and Belarus also supplied arms to 
Khartoum (yet paled in comparison to Chinese transactions)(Olimat, 6). Clearly, 
Beijing remembered the global outcry that sparked an international crusade against 
China for fueling the Darfur Crisis by the proliferation of Chinese weaponry, now 
understanding that business transactions of this sort are impossible to separate from the 
political context of violent conflict, let alone be credibly defended on the basis of non-
intervention. 
Support of Localized Multilateral Crisis Mediation Efforts 
Thus far, China’s mediation role has been facilitated through cooperation with 
the regional African multilateral institutions. Foreign Minister spokesperson Hong Lei 
has openly announced that China’s goal in the current conflict resolution efforts is to 
help secure “regional peace and [create] conditions for local development,” in direct 
support of localized initiatives (Tiezzi, The Diplomat). Namely, its involvement is 
concentrated via peace talks in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia as well as the 
headquarter of the AU, and also the Intergovernmental Authority of Development 
(IGAD) – an East African trade bloc including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda – which is the principle actor directing 
international efforts to strike a peace deal between the warring factions in South Sudan 
(Giorgio and Wagner, Huffington Post)(Tiezzi, The Diplomat). To date, China has 
donated over US$1 million to an IGAD-proposed monitoring mechanism that, 
following the first unsuccessful ceasefire deal struck in January 2014, was tasked to 
record violations of a second (now failed) ceasefire deal that was agreed upon between 
government and rebel leaders in May 2014 (Tiezzi, The Diplomat). As can be seen, 
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cooperation with crisis mediation initiatives through regional and global multilateral 
institutions echoes China’s involvement in the UN-AU led initiatives during the Darfur 
Crisis, and has not seen a change of course in the South Sudanese context.  
But what is most striking and marks yet another adjustment of its non-
intervention principle is China’s willingness to now directly engage both South Sudan’s 
government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) in 
the on-going mediation efforts. A specific demonstration is provided by Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi, who on 22 September 2014 organized a meeting in Beijing with top 
members of the SPLM-IO in order to “prepare ground for their leader’s visit to China”; 
he has also staged a similar meeting with South Sudanese government officials, SPLM-
IO leaders and IGAD officials in Khartoum (Hang, Jamestown)(Tiezzi, The Diplomat). 
According to Wang, China’s unprecedented decision to mediate between both sides was 
based on then President Hu Jintao’s pledge at the 5th FOCAC to “do more in the field of 
peace and stability…on the basis that we understand that sometimes this is also crucial 
to the development of the continent” (African Journalism the World). This is clearly 
opposite its role in the Darfur Crisis, where Chinese diplomats and government officials 
exclusively worked with the Khartoum regime in accordance with its foreign principles’ 
value of respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention, leaving other countries to 
meet with rebel groups. Beijing’s current Special Envoy to Africa, Zhong Jianhua, has 
made direct comments concerning this, saying, “I think for the last two decades we 
were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries…we try 
to avoid making direct contact with the opposition…When you talk to a rebel force that 
means stepping into internal affairs” (African Journalism the World). This is most 
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certainly a noteworthy progression of China’s active role in diplomatic mediation, 
indicating a growing intrusiveness in its approach towards conflict mediation. But 
again, and this needs to be emphasized, this is yet another minor adjustment of the non-
intervention policy – not abandonment.  
While there is a tendency among analysts and observers of China’s role in South 
Sudan to view this – and its current diplomatic actions in general – as a blatant 
indication that China is discarding non-intervention (a review of current news stories 
quickly reveals this), their statements are overblown. Following the same logic used to 
explain how the tripartite consent mechanism supported the core value of non-
intervention, the integrity of China’s non-intervention policy is again protected in this 
circumstance because China only engaged rebels following “the encouragement of 
IGAD,” and most importantly “with the agreement of the South Sudan government” 
(African Journalism the World). Because China acted in accordance with the regional 
institution involved, but above all with the consent of South Sudan’s government, China 
still formally respects the right of the sovereign state to allow or deny meddling in its 
internal affairs. Thus, while China’s role and recent actions in South Sudan’s civil 
conflict have remained consistent, and even expanded upon the active diplomacy 
witnessed in the Darfur Crisis, the extent of change indicates that for the foreseeable 
future, Beijing’s decisions regarding its diplomatic role in conflict mediation will 
continue to answer to its non-intervention policy as it upholds peace and security 
throughout Africa.             
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Chapter 3: China’s Changing Policy and Conclusion  
China’s Strategic Move 
“Now China is coming in and it means the West cannot use their help to hold us 
hostage anymore,” pronounced one official in Uganda about China’s diplomatic role in 
South Sudan’s civil conflict, a position typically filled by the West to “police the peace” 
in Africa (Ibuki, Reuters). Enthusiasm over China’s stepped-up role in upholding peace 
and security is echoed elsewhere in the region. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta noted 
that China “possesses substantial political, diplomatic and financial assets, which, if 
fully applied, would be a game-changer in the region’s peace and security;” South 
Sudanese Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin indicated that China’s reputation 
is growing because of its support for Africa on the U.N. Security Council, saying that, 
“This has given them the respect in Africa…So when they come to us people will 
actually listen,” (Ibuki, Reuters). What comments such as these indicate is that there is a 
tangible a shift in Africa’s perspective of China, showing that Africa’s leaders are 
realizing that verbal commitments to be a responsible stakeholder are being backed up 
with committed action; it has adjusted its rigid stance on its non-intervention policy 
enough to balance and maintain the economic attraction it generates in Africa, yet also 
accommodates African and Western criticisms of this policy applied in conflict 
situations that once justified Chinese inaction. Ultimately, this shows that China is 
thinking and acting strategically to secure its long-term economic and political interests 
in the continent and its reputational interests on the global stage; in doing so, China 
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gives African countries a continued reason to continue to look to the East to diversify its 
sources of development assistance away from traditional Western donors.      
 
Thesis Conclusion 
Above all, the Sudan and South Sudan case studies demonstrate that China is 
understanding a crucial lesson about its foreign policy agenda for Africa: as its 
economic interests and its presence grow in Africa, so must its sensitivity to and 
responsibility for the effect its economic presence has on the socio-political landscape 
of the countries it does business with, as well as on the continent as a whole. It is a 
long-term strategic imperative that must be realized; the future success of Sino-African 
relationships, its domestic resource security, its growing stature in the international 
community and its desire to influence the democratization of international relations to 
reflect a multi-value world system rely heavily on this realization. China appears to 
recognize that the foundation of its foreign policy, the non-intervention principle, is 
both the spearhead driving China’s economic relationship deeper into the continent, and 
as a result, the unique internal complexities of its developing African partners. Where 
the complexities are rooted in civil conflict, China’s growing sense of international 
responsibility principally urged by the West lends to its increasingly proactive, engaged, 
and responsive role in matters of Africa’s peace and security. If this sensibility 
continues to be meaningfully developed and is consistently backed by concrete action, 
its reputation will develop as a responsible stakeholder, and thus a responsive 
development partner, among its African partners.  
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With this reputation, it could allow China to move past its internationally 
questioned status as an exploitative development partner who only extracts what it 
needs; it could prove the sincerity of the political rhetoric espoused on regional 
platforms like FOCAC that guarantees a relationship with China is a win-win 
relationship for both sides; it could reflect globally in both the developing and 
developed regions of the world to its long-term benefit, if it continues to heed global 
calls to recognize its responsibilities as an emerging leader in the international 
community.
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